If he says, “If He occupies space, then other things that occupy space are like Him,” this begs the question. For he denies that He is a body on the basis of denying that He is a substance, and denies that He is a substance on the basis of a negation resting on the denial that He occupies space.

Yet things that occupy space are bodies—or substances and bodies. He has thus made the very proposition to be proved a premise in its own proof. This is precisely begging the question.

[The second argument]

Al-Āmidī said: “He either admits of spatiality or does not. If the former, He must be a composite body, which is impossible, as will be explained. If the latter, He must be comparable to an indivisible substance.”

One may reply: If by spatiality you mean His separation after being joined together, or His being joined together after separation, we do not concede that whatever is not like this must be diminutive.

If you mean something that can be pointed to, or in which one thing can be distinguished from another, we do not concede that this is impossible. Rather, we say that every independently subsisting existent is like this,