substantiality. If He were contingent, it would follow that He is not necessary in Himself. If He were unlike other substances, this would concede the point at issue.”

[Response to him]

The reply is: We do not concede that, if He were necessary in Himself, all substances would necessarily share in being necessary in themselves. Nor does it follow that sharing in substantiality entails sharing in all the attributes that are necessary, impossible, or possible for each of them.

Likewise, it will be said: We do not concede that His being unlike other substances would concede the point at issue. For saying that He is unlike other living beings, knowing but unlike other knowers, and powerful but unlike others who are powerful entails neither denying these attributes nor affirming the distinctive characteristics of created beings.

Thus, someone who calls Him a substance and explains this as either that which occupies space, that which subsists in itself, or that which exists in a subject does not concede that substances are alike. Rather, he says that they divide into necessary and contingent, just as living beings and knowing beings divide into these two categories.