body with regard to what is necessary, possible, or impossible for it. Alternatively, he may mean that He resembles them in what they all have in common, such that whatever is necessary, possible, or impossible for anything possessing that common element—even a single one of them—is likewise necessary, possible, or impossible for Him.

As for the first meaning, he either also maintains that bodies and substances are alike, or maintains that they differ. If he says that they are alike, his statement amounts to the second meaning, since whatever is possible for one is possible for another, whatever is necessary for one is necessary for another, and whatever is impossible for one is impossible for another, by virtue of its essence.

If, however, he says that they differ, he cannot consistently maintain that He is like bodies. On this assumption, it is known that not every body is like another, and that what is possible for one is not necessarily possible for another. How, then, can it be said of the Creator, glory be to Him, that whatever is possible for every self-subsisting created being is possible for Him—even in the case of inanimate things, plants, and animals?

No rational person says this, not even those who profess the oneness of existence. In their view, He is the very existence of created bodies; nevertheless, they do not say that whatever is possible for the existence of this particular being is possible for the existence of all beings.

And even if this person says that He is like created bodies in what they have in common, such that whatever is possible for them collectively—not for each one individually—is possible for Him, then this