and two instances of power, two distinct wills, and two perceptions. Then, if it is supposed that the locus of these attributes can only be a body, the question remains concerning the body: is it composite? Is it composed of indivisible atoms, or of matter and form, or of neither?

[Theorists hold three views on the composition of bodies]

Theorists hold three views on this matter.

Those who maintain that bodies are composed of indivisible atoms have fallen into disagreement concerning the locus of knowledge and similar attributes in a human being. Is it a single atom in the heart, as is reported of Ibn al-Rāwandī? Or, when accidents whose existence requires life subsist in one part of the whole, is the rest of the whole also characterized by them, as the Muʿtazila maintain? Or does the effect of an accident not extend beyond its locus, with each indivisible atom instead bearing its own particular accident of knowledge, power, or the like, as al-Ashʿarī maintains? These are three views.

Those who do not affirm the indivisible atom are not bound by this consequence. Rather, they say that an accident subsisting in a body is not itself divided, just as the body is not divided. Its capacity for division, however, is like the body’s capacity for division.

These thinkers say that life, power, and sensation subsist in a human being throughout the entire body. They also say that the human body is not composed of indivisible atoms; thus, the objections that arise against the others do not arise against them.