Thus, when they saw that revelation indicated that what is brought into being is connected with an utterance and a will, coming into being immediately thereafter, and knew that the Lord’s utterance and will subsist only in His own Essence, they adopted this position.

Moreover, all groups distinguish between one newly arising thing and another, stipulating conditions for one that they do not stipulate for the other.

The philosophers say:
“Every newly arising thing depends on the things that arise before it.”
They do not treat all newly arising things alike.

The Basran Muʿtazilah say that nothing is brought into being except through a will, and that attributes subsist only in a substrate. Yet they say that will came into being without a will and subsisted without a substrate. They hold the same concerning annihilation.

The Ashʿarīs distinguish between creation and other things.

Furthermore, one of two possibilities must hold: either there is a relevant distinction between these two newly arising things, or there is not. If there is a relevant distinction, the argument against them fails. If there is no relevant distinction, they must be mistaken in one of their two positions: either in considering eternal power sufficient to bring things into being, or in affirming something newly arising for created things separate from Him.