will, as their doctrine holds, requires it, despite being a single attribute, to subsist in two or more parts. This contradicts their doctrine.”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Commentary]

I say:

One might say: Their statement that a single accident cannot subsist in two atoms, together with their assertion that speech and will subsist in Allah Most High, is not peculiar to the question of newly arising occurrences. For, according to them, eternal knowledge, power, and will subsist in the essence of Allah Most High. As regards subsistence in His essence, there is no difference between being eternal and being newly arising, with respect to the essence of Allah Most High. As regards subsistence in His essence, there is no difference between being eternal and being newly arising, insofar as a single attribute subsists in two parts. Rather, this discussion concerns attributes generally, and its proper place is elsewhere.

Furthermore, it may be said:

If their doctrine is that the Lord occupies space, as he reports—although Ibn al-Haysam and others among them deny that He occupies space—then the most that the Muʿtazilah’s argument against them establishes is that, if attributes and newly arising occurrences subsist in Him, He must occupy space. If they already accept this, it is consistent with their position. The discussion would then no longer concern this question; rather, the debate with the Muʿtazilah would return to the question of occupying space.

When the discussion returns to a single foundational issue, it becomes easier to address, while