is unsound. Rather, they denied them because of what distinguishes them from the attributes of a living being.

Furthermore, it may be said: The distinction they draw between color and smell, on the one hand, and speech and will, on the other, is either material or it is not.

If it is material, the argument against them from their own premises fails. If it is not, they must be mistaken in one of the two cases, without determining which. Why, then, could their error not lie in what they denied rather than in what they affirmed? Thus, it does not establish the correctness of the two cases without specifying which. Why, then, could their error not lie in what they denied rather than in what they affirmed? This therefore does not establish the correctness of their opponent’s position concerning what they affirmed. If their opponent provides rational or scriptural evidence for denying color and smell, but not speech and will, that would constitute a material distinction. If he provides evidence denying that any of these can subsist in Him, that would be sufficient proof without resorting to an argument from their own premises.

[The Fourth Argument]

Al-Āmidī said: “It is part of their doctrine that the Lord occupies space, that He faces the Throne and is larger than it, and that He does not face a single indivisible atom of the Throne.

They have stated that a single accident cannot subsist in two atoms ن, and the newly arising attribute in the essence of Allah Most High, namely speech or