of speech, will, tastes, smells, and colors in substances, although those substances may possess such attributes. They have deemed it impossible for colors, tastes, and smells to subsist in the essence of Allah Most High, yet have allowed this for speech and will. If they were asked, “Why have you ruled that tastes, colors, and smells may subsist in the essence of Allah Most High without its being impossible for Him to be devoid of them, as with newly arising speech and will?” they would have no way of drawing a distinction.

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Commentary]

It may be said in response:

Someone could say: Their answer to this is like that of the Ash‘arīs and the Sālimīs when asked, “Why do you attribute speech and will to the Lord, but not taste, color, and smell?”

If they answer, “Because speech and will are attributes that presuppose life, and life is an attribute of perfection, unlike taste, color, and smell,” or offer some other distinction, the Karrāmīs can give a similar answer. The distinction between the two is therefore not peculiar to the question of newly arising occurrences subsisting in Him. For whoever denies those attributes holds that they must be denied, whether or not he accepts that newly arising occurrences may subsist in Him. The two differ only in that one allows these attributes to arise, whereas the other does not. In short, they did not deny taste, color, and smell on the grounds that, if He could possess them, He could never be devoid of them; for, in their view, this principle