They would then say: “This objection and counterargument likewise depend on its being impossible for Him to be characterized by newly arising occurrences. Why, then, did you say that this is impossible?”

It is thus clear that an objection of this kind leaves neither them nor their opponents who concede the impossibility of an infinite succession of newly arising occurrences without an answer.

As for someone who holds that an infinite succession of newly arising occurrences is possible, he can demonstrate the error in their distinction and say:

“If a living being cannot be devoid of both what it is capable of possessing and its opposite, and the Lord Most High is capable of being characterized by speech and will, then He cannot be devoid of both these and their opposite. Yet their opposite is an attribute of imperfection, like the opposite of hearing and sight. It therefore follows that He has always been characterized by speech and will, and being characterized by this kind of attribute is possible.”

They have a third response to the objection he mentioned, namely to say: We said that a living being capable of possessing these attributes cannot be devoid of both them and their general opposite, which includes the absence of these attributes. We did not say that it cannot be devoid of both them and an existent opposite, for that is not our position. In our view, something capable of possessing a thing and its existent opposite may be devoid of both.

The Ashʿarīs, however, say: Something capable of possessing a thing cannot be devoid of both it and its existent opposite.

That being so, the opposite of speech and will is their absence. Thus, one cannot say, “The same argument applies to their opposite as applies to them, and an infinite succession of newly arising occurrences necessarily follows,” because their opposite is absence, and in our view absence does not require an agent.