and possessing will and, at the same time, of their general opposite, just as He cannot be devoid of both hearing and sight themselves and their general opposite.

If it is said, “Some of them distinguish speech and will from acts of hearing and seeing,” the response is: It has already been stated that this is not the view commonly attributed to them.

Whether or not it is their commonly held view, it may be said: If the case used to press the objection is like the case on which there is agreement, then those among them who distinguish between the two cases must be mistaken. If there is a difference between them that affects the judgment, then those among them who equate the two must be mistaken. On either assumption, it does not follow that the opponent of both groups is correct.

Furthermore, it may be said: Either a succession of newly arising occurrences is possible or it is impossible. If it is possible, they were mistaken in saying that He can be devoid of both speech and will and their opposite, since these could occur in Him successively forever. If it is impossible, this impossibility constitutes the difference between these and hearing and sight: He can be characterized from eternity by hearing and sight, but not by newly arising speech and will.

On this basis, however, it does not follow that they contradict themselves in saying that whatever is capable of possessing something cannot be devoid of both it and its opposite. For they say that He is not capable, from eternity, of being characterized by newly arising occurrences.

But it may be said to them: This depends on the possibility of His being characterized by newly arising occurrences. Why, then, did you say that this is possible?