It may also be said:

The Karrāmiyya held this view because, according to them, He has possessed the attributes of perfection from eternity, and all His names are the most beautiful names, conveying praise and commendation of Him. Since that newly arising occurrence cannot be beginningless, it cannot warrant a name.

It may then be said:

Either the kind of occurrence in question can be perpetual, or it cannot. If it can, they have erred in denying its perpetuity. If it cannot, then either a new name can become applicable to Him, or it cannot.

If this is possible, they have erred in denying that name; if it is impossible, they are correct. Thus, even supposing them mistaken under some of these alternatives, it does not follow that their opponents’ position is correct.

[Second]

Al-Āmidī said that the Karrāmiyya agree that speech and will can subsist only in one who is living, just as hearing and sight do. They also agree that if a living being is devoid of hearing and sight, it cannot be devoid of their opposites. They must then either say that Allah is devoid both of newly arising speech and will and of their opposites—in which case they can find no way to distinguish these from hearing and sight.