The same holds for all other attributes subsisting in their subjects, whether the subject is eternal or comes into being, and whether the attribute is eternal or comes into being. For an eternal subject and one that comes into being do not differ insofar as each is a subject in which its attribute subsists, except in some extraneous respect that has no bearing on the matter. Once this is established, it follows that He must be called a speaker by virtue of speech and one who wills by virtue of a will. This entails that a new name becomes applicable to Him which was not applicable before the newly arising attribute subsisted in Him, contradicting their position.”

[Ibn Taymiyya’s Commentary]

I say: One might respond:

This is a matter of terminology and verbal convention, not a question of rational inquiry. Their naming Him only by what is inseparable from His essence, rather than by what occurs in it, is a convention they have adopted. Knowledge, power, and similar attributes cannot be raised as objections against them, since these are inseparable from His essence. Perhaps they claim that this restriction is dictated by revelation, just as others make such a claim regarding many names they refrain from applying to Him.

One may also say:

This either follows necessarily from their position or it does not. If it does not, the objection based on it fails. If it does, they can accept it, for it entails nothing more than new names becoming applicable to Him as new acts of His occur.

Their opponent maintains the same concerning all acts: His entitlement to their corresponding names arises anew when those acts occur, as with “the Creator,” “the Provider,” and similar names.

Thus, if this is correct, the two correct positions can be reconciled by affirming both the occurrence of what comes into being and the new applicability of the name.