its nonexistence; nor is denying the Messenger’s truthfulness nobler than not denying it, nor is the existence of something impossible nobler than its nonexistence.

If what is meant is the existence of something possible and appropriate, the reply is: We do not concede that it was possible and appropriate for what came into being to do so before the time when it actually came into being. Thus, its being a perfection at the time of its existence does not entail that its prior absence was a deficiency.

The argument rests on two misleading premises. The first is that whatever perfection came to exist must previously have been absent in a way that constituted a deficiency. This requires distinctions, as has been explained. The second is that whatever does not constitute a perfection on its own must be categorically denied of the Lord. This too requires distinctions, as discussed earlier. For the argument runs: If what comes into being is a perfection, its prior absence is a deficiency; if it is not a perfection, the Lord cannot possess what is not a perfection. The misleading presentation and ambiguity in both premises have already been explained, and the matter admits of a fuller exposition than this.

[Al-Āmidī’s Refutation of the Karrāmiyya in Eight Arguments]

Al-Āmidī said: “The second proof proceeds by exposing contradictions in the opponent’s position and showing what it entails. It comprises eight arguments.

The First

The Karrāmiyya hold that no newly arising name may be applied to Allah Most High at any future time, as we explained previously. If attributes that come into being were to subsist in His essence, He would be characterized by them, and their corresponding predicates would apply to Him. Knowledge, for example, necessarily characterizes the subject in which it subsists as knowing.