in the absence of the others, it is not a perfection. For it is evident that, if we present sound reason with a being incapable of acting on its own and another that acts continually, one act after another, the latter is more perfect than the former. Perfection would thus lie in the beginninglessness of this kind of activity.

Likewise, if we conceive of something that speaks whenever it wills, saying whatever it wills, and has always been so, and another that can speak only at certain times, or that acquired speech after previously lacking it, the former would be more perfect.

The crux of the answer is this: if any one instance is not a perfection on its own, it does not follow that it is not a perfection together with the other instances of its kind.

However, this answer is appropriate only to the position of those who say that He has always been characterized by this kind of activity.

The Karrāmiyyah do not say this. Rather, they say that He acquired this kind after previously lacking it. Yet the Karrāmiyyah say: “Our position concerning this kind is like the position of others concerning separate temporal occurrences: since the perpetual occurrence of this kind is impossible, owing to the impossibility of temporal occurrences in pre-eternity, it does not follow that He lacks the attributes of perfection, for the absence of what is impossible is not a deficiency.”

[The Fifth Argument]

To examine this precisely, one may address the assertion: “If this is a perfection, then the Lord was deficient before being characterized by it.”