because of a consideration absent from what I affirm. I denied that other matter only because of a consideration peculiar to it. If that basis is sound, the two need not be treated alike; if it is unsound, it follows that I was mistaken in denying that other matter. In that case, if the two are equivalent, it follows that I was mistaken in distinguishing between them. Yet there is no greater reason to regard my affirmation of what I affirmed as mistaken than my denial of that other matter. In that case, if the two are equivalent, it follows that I was mistaken in distinguishing between them. Yet there is no greater reason to regard my affirmation of what I affirmed as mistaken than my denial of what I denied. Thus, if their equivalence is established, this only demonstrates my inconsistency; it does not establish the correctness of your position. If the distinction is established, your claim is invalid.”

It thus becomes clear that this consensus is one of those composite consensuses that amount to a dialectical argument. Even if valid, it would establish only the opponent’s inconsistency.

[The third point]

It may be said:

The argument you have presented is countered by your allowing that Allah brings events into existence after they did not exist—that is, His being an agent. His agency must either be an attribute of perfection or not be an attribute of perfection.

If it is a perfection, then He lacked that perfection before acting. If it is not a perfection, it follows that He possesses attributes other than attributes of perfection. This is impossible on these two grounds.

If you say that action is a relation and an attribution, you are told:

Attributing this newly occurring thing to Him is likewise a relation and an attribution. There is no difference between the two except that one is connected to Him and the other is separate from Him.