The first reply is: “We do not concede that an attribute’s inherence in its substrate requires a cause more general than that substrate. Rather, an attribute inseparable from its substrate depends on that particular substrate for a reason peculiar to it. Its presence there cannot be explained by something more general, for when a cause is more general than its effect, the causal explanation is open to counterexamples.”

If it is said, “We are explaining the inherence of attributes in general,” such inherence requires nothing beyond a substrate in which an attribute subsists, even if the thought that it occupies space never enters the mind.

If it is said, “Occupying space is inseparable from the substrate in which attributes subsist,” the reply is: “Subsisting in itself is also inseparable from the bearer of attributes, as are other characteristics.”

Moreover, the discussion of occupying space is as set out above. In short, this concerns attributes in general, not temporal occurrences in particular. Undoubtedly, those who deny the attributes—the Jahmiyyah, the Muʿtazilah, and the philosophers—advance the same arguments in both cases. The invalidity of their foundational principles has been explained elsewhere.

[Al-Āmidī’s method for establishing the impossibility of temporal occurrences inhering in Allah’s Essence]

Al-Āmidī said: “This matter rests on two arguments: one establishing the case directly, and the other based on the opponent’s own premises.