[The fourth perspective]

It may be said:

Reason either knows that the Messenger is truthful and that what he has reported is true in reality, or it does not know this.

If it does not know this, no conflict can arise for it if the rational proposition is known to it, because what is known cannot be contradicted by what is unknown. If the rational proposition is not known to it either, two unknown matters do not stand in conflict.

If, however, it knows that the Messenger is truthful, it cannot, while knowing this, fail to know that what he has reported is true in reality.

At most, it may say, “He did not report this.” But the discussion does not concern what he has not reported. Rather, if reason knows that the Messenger reported something, can it—with its knowledge that he is truthful in what he reports, and its knowledge that he reported this—rid itself of the knowledge that what he reported is true? Or does its knowledge of the truth of his report follow necessarily, just as all other knowledge follows necessarily from its premises?

If this is so, then when it is told in such a case:

“Do not believe that what you know he has reported is true, because this belief conflicts with the grounds on which you know him to be truthful,”

what this really means is:

“Do not believe him concerning this report, because believing him entails not believing him.”

It then replies:

“But my not believing him concerning it is precisely the feared consequence.”

Thus, to say:

“Do not believe him, lest this entail your not believing him,”

is like saying:

“Declare him false, lest this entail your declaring him false.”

Thus, what is forbidden is itself the feared consequence of doing what is forbidden, and what is commanded is itself the feared consequence of failing to do what is commanded. He will therefore be doing what is forbidden whether he obeys or disobeys, and failing to do what is commanded whether he obeys