He answered this argument by countering it with the case of bringing things into existence and originating them. For those who deny an infinite regress of effects, this is something that supervenes upon the essence, not something inseparable from it. The same reasoning therefore applies to His receptivity to these things as to His producing them, since an infinite regress with respect to the recipient is like an infinite regress with respect to the agent.

This reply is of the same kind as his reply to the first argument. It is valid on the premise held by those among the Mu'tazilah, Ash'ariyyah, Sālimiyyah and others who agree with the Karrāmiyyah. They adopted this premise from the Jahmiyyah and the Qadariyyah among the Mu'tazilah and others like them.

As for the second premise, one may say:

We do not concede that the existence of receptivity from eternity entails the possibility of what is received existing from eternity. The evidence for this is that power exists from eternity, yet, according to these groups, what lies within that power cannot exist from eternity.

This reply, too, addresses those who agree with him on that point. The essential point in both replies is that their claim concerning what is received is refuted by the counterexample of what lies within His power. Newly arising things that are received constitute one class of things within His power; they differ from the others only in their locus. One lies within His power and exists within His essence, while the other lies within His power and is separate from His essence. For His power subsists in His essence, and the object of that power is His act, which subsists in His essence, although created things, too, lie within His power according to them. Thus, in their view, this separate thing