what lies within His power by means of His power, and to the Lord’s being the Creator of newly arising things, for this is a relation that newly arises after not having existed. Whatever answer is given here can equally be given there. Even if we concede that receptivity in the future entails receptivity from eternity, we do not concede that this entails the possibility of the received thing’s existing from eternity. Thus, according to our principles, the Creator possesses, from eternity, the power to create the world, yet this does not entail that the world could exist from eternity.

I say:

He has mentioned two ways of invalidating this argument, which together deny its two premises. For it rests on two premises:

First: If He were receptive, His receptivity would be eternal.

Second: The received thing can exist together with the received thing.

In response to the first, one may say: We do not concede that, if He is receptive to newly arising things throughout the future, it follows that He is receptive to them from eternity. Their existence in the future is possible, whereas their existence from eternity is impossible. Receptivity to what is possible therefore does not entail receptivity to what is impossible. This is like saying: If newly arising things can come into existence in the future, they can also come into existence from eternity.

They have argued for this by saying that receptivity must be inseparable from the essence, since, if it were something that supervened upon the essence, receptivity would require a further receptivity, resulting in an infinite regress.