Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (4/56)

Thus, if it were said, “If an accident could inhere in Him, then every accident would necessarily inhere in Him,” this too would be false. Its inherence would not be on account of its being an accident, such that every accident would necessarily inhere in Him.

Muslims agree that Allah is the Creator of everything that exists other than Himself. Suppose someone said, “If He could create something that exists, it would follow that He creates everything that exists. He would therefore be His own Creator, which is impossible.” Or suppose someone said, “If He could create a being endowed with knowledge, power, and life, it would follow that He creates every being endowed with life, knowledge, and power. Yet He Himself possesses life, knowledge, and power, so He would be His own Creator, which is impossible.” Such reasoning would be false.

The basis of this argument is as follows: the one who denies makes a universal denial that any attribute can inhere in Allah, or that what He wills and has power over can inhere in Him, on the grounds that it is an event. He thus universally denies that any event, or anything of that kind, can inhere in Him. The one who affirms counters him by contradicting this universal assertion—this universal negative proposition. Its falsity can be established by a particular affirmation, namely, a particular affirmative proposition: some attribute or some event may inhere in Him. What may thus inhere in Him is not admissible on account of a feature it shares with all other attributes and events. Rather, it inheres in Him on account of a feature peculiar to it and others of its kind, which not all attributes and events share.

However, just as the shared feature does not necessitate inherence in the divine essence, neither does it preclude it. Thus, the fact that what inheres in Him is an attribute or an event does not necessitate its inherence in Him, such that every attribute and event would inhere in Him; nor does it preclude inherence in Him, such that every attribute and event would be excluded.

فإذا قيل: لو جاز أن يقوم به عرض لزم أن يقوم به كل عرض، لكان هذا أيضاً باطلاً فإن ذلك لم يكن لكونه عرضاً فيلزم قيام كل عرض به. والمسلمون متفقون على أن الله خالق كل موجود سواه فلو قيل: لو جاز أن يخلق موجوداً للزم أن يخلق كل موجود، فيلزم أن يكون خالقاً لنفسه وهو محال. أو لو قيل: لو جاز أن يخلق عالما قادرا حيا لزم أن يخلق كل حي عالم قادر، وهو حي عالم قادر، فيلزم أن يكون خالقاً لنفسه وهو محال لكان هذا كلاماً باطلاً. وأصل هذا أن السالب النافي لما نفي نفياً عاما أن يقوم بالله صفة أو أن يقوم به ما يريده ويقدره عليه لكونه حادثاً فنفي عاماً أن يقوم به حادث ونحو ذلك قابلة المثبت فناقض هذا الخبر العام وهذه القضية السالبة الكلية، وكذبها يحصل بإثبات خاص، وهو القضية الجزئية الموجبة، فيجوز قيام صفة ما من الصفات، وحادث ما من الحوادث وذلك الجائز لم يجز قيامه للمعنى المشترك بينه وبين سائر الصفات والحوادث، وإنما قام لمعنى يختص به وبأمثاله لا يشاركه فيه جميع الصفات والحوادث. لكن المشترك، كما انه ليس هو المقتضي له للقيام بالذات فليس هو مانعاً فكون القائم به صفات أو حادثاً ليس أمراً موجباً للقيام به حتى يقوم كل صفة وحادث ولا مانعا من القيام به حتى يمنع كل صفة وحادث.