If that is so, their argument is invalid, for at most it establishes that His intending events within His essence entails that His essence is in a direction. Denying this consequence is therefore invalid.

Alternatively, it may be said:

Intending something does not entail that it is in a direction relative to the one who intends it. In that case, this argument is invalid. Its invalidity is thus established on either supposition.

To clarify its flaw: it rests on two premises. The truth of one entails the falsity of the other, while its falsity entails that one of the two premises is false. Thus, one of them must be false in any case. When one of the premises is false, the argument is invalid. The first premise is that one who intends something intends only what is in a direction.

The second is that it is impossible for the Creator to be in a direction.

If the first premise is true, it follows that He is in a direction, since He certainly intends events to occur. The second premise is therefore false.

If the first premise is false, the argument is likewise invalid because one of its two premises is false.

Just as the flaw in this argument is evident according to the principles of the adherents of religious traditions and others who maintain that the world came into existence, its invalidity is even more evident according to the view of the eternalist philosophers.

These philosophers do not deny that events occur. If they say that these events arise from an eternal cause that necessitates its effects by its very nature, as Ibn Sīnā and others like him maintain, then they hold that events arise from Him through intermediaries.