accept that implication.

This is not the place to discuss the categories.

Now, whoever makes this statement either allows that things distinct from the Lord can be in a direction relative to Him, or does not. If he allows this, he accepts the implication, while the point at issue remains disputed. If he does not, this demonstrates the invalidity of his position on direction, thereby further strengthening the position of the Karrāmiyyah and those who agree with them.

If, however, they mean that intending something to occur in a substrate which is His own essence entails that His essence must be in a direction relative to itself, he may be asked:

Is it conceivable for something to be in a direction relative to itself or not? If this is conceivable, they accept the necessary connection; if it is not, they deny that connection.

This is illustrated by the fact that a human being brings about events within himself through his intention and direction. The same question applies here: if it is conceivable for his self to be in a direction relative to itself, those disputing the argument can accept that implication in every case; otherwise, they cannot.

Furthermore, it may be said:

Intending something either entails that it is in a direction relative to the one who intends it, or does not entail this. If it does, then all bodies must be in a direction relative to the Lord. For when He brings about newly arising accidents in them, He intends them, according to what they have stated. On this assumption, they must therefore be in a direction relative to Him.

He must then also be in a direction relative to them, since, as they have stated, it is impossible for one of two things to be in a direction relative to the other without the reverse also being true. If that is so, it follows that the Creator is in a direction.