scriptural proofs, while resisting what the scriptural and rational proofs establish. Although we do not suppose that any Muslim—or indeed any rational person—would speak concerning divine lordship in a manner he considers deficient, anyone following this approach must suffer from either inability or negligence. Either reveals his inferiority to the imams of the early generations, who were in accord with revelation and reason, and shows that they surpassed their opponents in these questions concerning divinity and this knowledge of the Lord.

This argument, which al-Āmidī presented first and then rejected as unsound, is the argument relied upon by the Kullābīs, the Ash'arīs, and those who agreed with them among the Sālimīs and the jurists from among Ahmad’s followers and others, such as the judge Abū Ya'lā, Ibn 'Aqīl, Ibn al-Zāghūnī, and others. It rests on two premises: whatever is capable of possessing something cannot be devoid of both it and its opposite. Most people dispute this with them; indeed, all the groups concerned with rational inquiry and transmitted reports dispute it, including the Mu'tazilites, Karrāmites, Shiites, Murji'ites, hadith scholars, jurists, Sufis, and philosophers.

The second premise:

That an infinite succession of temporal events is impossible. The dispute over this is well known among all the groups.

Al-Āmidī said: “The second argument is that if temporal events subsisted in the essence of the Lord, exalted is He, they would have a cause.

The cause would be either the essence or something external to it.

If it were the essence, their continued existence would necessarily follow from the continued existence of