He said: “If the opposition between perception and its negation means contradictory opposition through negation and affirmation—namely, that He must either hear, see, and speak, or not—then this is what the opponent maintains, and its denial cannot be accepted without evidence.

“If, however, the opposition means that between privation and possession, then negating possession does not entail the presence of privation, nor does the converse hold, except in a subject capable of both. Thus, it is correct to say that a stone is neither blind nor sighted. To assert that the Creator Most High is capable of sight and blindness is to assert the very point in dispute and beg the question. On this basis, it is impossible to deny that blindness, muteness, and deafness necessarily follow, in the case of Allah Most High, from denying Him sight, hearing, and speech.”

I say: This has perplexed many speculative thinkers, leading them astray because they believed it sound; it perplexed even al-Āmidī. Such, then, are his words concerning being devoid of both opposites in the broad sense, against which he has raised the objection just mentioned. How, then, can he claim that he