the eternalist philosophers who maintain that the motions of the celestial spheres proceed from a beginningless, eternal being from whom nothing new comes into existence. It has also been shown that their view is more unsound than that of the Muʿtazila and similar speculative theologians. These philosophers argue for the eternity of the world using their principal argument: if it came into existence after not existing, it would require a newly occurring cause. The same argument would apply to that cause, thus entailing either an infinite regress or one alternative prevailing without a determining factor.

They may be told:

You maintain that events come into existence successively from a self-subsisting agent in whom no attribute or act subsists, and to whom no new act or anything else occurs.

Your claim that diverse events proceed perpetually from one who has neither act nor attribute, and from whom nothing new occurs, is more unsound than the claim of someone who says that events sometimes proceed from Him and sometimes proceed from Him. For if events proceeding from Him without anything new occurring in Him is impossible, then their proceeding perpetually from Him without anything new occurring in Him is even more impossible.

[The ninth argument]

It may be said:

Allah’s acts either have a wisdom that constitutes their intended end, or they do not. There are two well-known positions among people on this matter: the first affirms only His will; the second affirms a wisdom subsisting either in the created being or in the Creator. These three views are well known among the various groups of Ahmad’s followers and others.