and preceded by nonexistence, and is therefore temporally originated. As for substances, we have already demonstrated that substances cannot be devoid of accidents. Since the accidents of which substances cannot be devoid are temporally originated and preceded by nonexistence, the same applies to substances: whatever cannot be devoid of something that has a beginning must itself have a beginning and be temporally originated.

Otherwise, if a substance were eternal, it would follow either that it was devoid of accidents in its eternal existence, or that accidents had no beginning. Both alternatives are impossible, as explained earlier.

As for establishing the second premise of the original argument: when something’s parts are temporally originated and have a first beginning to which they can be traced back, the composite whole they form is likewise temporally originated and preceded by nonexistence. This is known necessarily.

This completes his exposition of the approach he endorsed.

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary]

One might say:

This argument is much weaker than the one al-Rāzī presented. Indeed, al-Rāzī did not pursue it because of its weakness; instead, he used the argument from motion and rest, as did those among the Muʿtazilah who employed it. This argument rests on two premises, one of which is that no accident can persist, and the majority of