The most this line of argument establishes is that bodies are never devoid of events that come into being.

[Al-Āmidī’s presentation of this line of argument]

Al-Āmidī said: “Even if we concede that the attributes referred to have come into being, it does not follow that substances and bodies have come into being, since these attributes could succeed one another in them without limit. That conclusion requires recourse to the earlier argument that a succession of events without a first event to which it can be traced back is impossible.”

[Al-Āmidī mentions seven lines of argument for bodies having come into being and rejects six of them]

I say:

This is what Al-Āmidī relied upon in this question. He mentioned seven lines of argument for bodies having come into being and rejected six of them:

The first: the argument from contingency—that a body is contingent, and everything contingent is brought into being.

The second: the argument from particular determination.

The third: the argument from a determinate spatial location.

The fourth: the argument from beginninglessness—that it is beginningless.

The fifth: another argument from contingency, but one that posits their having come into being by a different method.

The sixth: the argument from motion and rest, which Al-Rāzī presented earlier.