This shared element is the universal, which does not exist as a universal in the external world. It is universal only in minds, not in concrete entities.

It has also been explained how the logicians erred in claiming that realities are composed of these universals, and how their metaphysics and natural philosophy became corrupted. They treat one thing as two, as with the body, and two things as one, as with knowledge and the knower, or will and power. They treat what exists as nonexistent, as with the divine reality and its attributes and acts, and what does not exist as existent, as with absolute existence. They also treat what exists in the mind as existing in the external world, as with immaterial entities and universals, and other such matters that cannot be discussed at length here.

The second point is that, even if it were conceded that a body is composed of aggregated substances, the same argument applies to their aggregation as to its magnitude. The invalidity of his claim that its having that particular aggregation requires a determining factor has already been explained, just as with his claim that its having a particular magnitude requires a determining factor. This rests on the premise that whatever has a specific determination requires a determining factor.

As for the second premise, it was substantiated by arguing that the determining factor must be a freely choosing agent, and that the feature it assigns must have come into being. Al-Āmidī and others have refuted both premises.