The fourth is the view that bodies are composed of neither of these, but admit of division into indivisible substances. This is the view of al-Shahrastānī and others.

The fifth is the view that bodies are composed of neither of these ن, and admit neither of division into indivisible parts nor of division without limit. Rather, every existing part admits of mental division but not actual division; it undergoes transformation when it becomes very small, just as the parts of matter break down and undergo transformation when they become small, turning into air ن. Thus, there is no part whose right side cannot be distinguished from its left, nor any part that admits of division without limit.

Those who hold this view have avoided both difficulties. For those who affirm the existence of an indivisible part have been confronted by their opponents with the objection that one of its sides must be distinguishable from the other ن, and whatever has this property admits of the very division under dispute.

Their opponents have also objected that, if such a part is placed between two substances and touches one with precisely the same portion with which it touches the other, it cannot lie between them. If, however, it touches one with a different portion from that with which it touches the other, it must be divisible. They have pressed objections of this kind from which there is no escape.

Those who deny the existence of an indivisible part and maintain that bodies can be divided without end have been confronted by their opponents with the consequences that a small body would be like a large one, and that what is infinite would be confined between two bounds.