As for the first premise, it was supported by two arguments.

The first is that whatever has a particular magnitude must have something to determine that magnitude. The invalidity of this argument has also been shown.

The second is that the substances of the world must be either joined together, separated, both joined together and separated, neither joined together nor separated, or partly joined together and partly separated. Neither the absence of both states nor their coexistence is possible. The remaining alternatives, however, are possible. Whatever configuration is postulated, an alternative can be postulated; it is therefore contingent, and whatever is contingent requires something to determine it.

This is the weaker of the two arguments.

First, it rests on the claim that bodies are composed of discrete substances and that every body admits of combination and separation. Most rational people hold otherwise, for there are several views on this matter.

The first is the view that bodies are composed of discrete substances that do not admit of division. This is the view of most of the Muʿtazilah, those Ashʿarīs who agree with them, and others who follow them.

The second is the view that bodies are composed of infinitely many substances. This is the view of al-Nazzām and his followers.

The third is the view that bodies are composed of matter and form and admit of division without end. This is the view of Ibn Sīnā and others like him among the philosophers.