and it is said to be eternal and an accident, while every accident comes into being and does not persist for two moments, then its renewal through successive like instances would be even more warranted than that of other accidents. Thus, what he called composition and deemed an eternal accident is affirmed on the same basis as the other eternal attributes.

[The third point]

One may say: What you have called an eternal accident is subject to the same judgment as the other attributes. If you establish evidence negating the attributes, this too may be negated; otherwise, the same applies to it as to its counterparts 0. Yet you have no evidence for negating the attributes except the negation of the combination and multiplicity that you have called composition. If you can negate this only by negating the other attributes, and can negate the attributes only by negating this, that constitutes an invalid circular dependence of prerequisites. It has become clear that you can negate neither this nor this, and that your use of the term composition is misleading: it gives those who do not understand what is actually meant the impression that those who affirm the attributes have attributed to Allah Most High something for which He needs an agent to compose Him together with it.

Every rational person knows that the position of Muslims who affirm the attributes is that His eternal attributes are inseparable from His essence, and that He depends on no one besides Himself for them. Anyone who makes His possession of these attributes dependent on an agent other than Himself is, in their view, an unbeliever—let alone that they themselves should say He needs an agent who has joined Him to His attributes.

[The fourth point]

One may say, hypothetically: If some of your fellow philosophers disputed your claim that a composite cannot be eternal in itself, you would have no argument against them. Even if it were supposed that this entails a composite eternal in itself, you would have no argument on the principles of