the different attributes refer to a single essence, so that knowledge, for example, will, and power have one and the same conceptual meaning and are a single essence. Likewise, knowledge and the knower, power and the one who is powerful, and will and the one who wills would all have one and the same meaning. The objection raised against those who say that there is an essence with attributes additional to it is that the essence would be a condition for the existence of the attributes, while the attributes would be a condition for the perfection of the essence. The whole would then be something necessarily existent—that is, a single existent containing neither cause nor effect.”

He said: “Yet this objection cannot, in truth, be answered if one posits something necessarily existent in itself. For it must be one in every respect and entirely without composition: neither of a condition and that which depends upon it, nor of a cause and an effect. For any existent of this kind must have a composition that is either necessary or contingent. If its composition is necessary, it is necessary through something other than itself, not through itself, since it is difficult to posit a composite that is eternal in itself—I mean, without anything that composes it. This is especially so according to those who posit that every accident comes into being, since its composition would then be an eternal accident. If its composition is contingent, it requires something that necessitates the conjunction of cause and effect.”