endowed with the attributes of perfection, one cannot rightly say: “Its possession of the attributes of perfection makes it dependent upon those attributes and therefore capable of ceasing to exist.” The invalidity of this argument is evident. It is equivalent to saying: “Your description of it as ‘existent in itself’ or ‘necessarily existent in itself’ implies that it depends upon itself; whatever is dependent cannot be necessarily existent in itself, but must be capable of ceasing to exist.” If this is invalid, the first argument is even more so, for its attributes of perfection are included in what is meant by its self. Thus, if saying that it depends upon itself does not preclude its necessary existence, then saying that it depends upon its attributes is all the more clearly no impediment to its necessary existence.

The same applies if someone calls these attributes parts and says: “It depends upon its parts.” A thing’s part, portion, attribute, and the like are included in what is meant by its self. If saying, “It depends upon itself,” does not preclude its necessary existence ن, then saying, “It depends upon its part, attribute, and the like,” is all the more clearly no impediment. Calling this dependence is misleading and deceptive language, suggesting to the uninformed that it is in need.

This is like saying, “He is self-sufficient,” only for someone to reply, “Then He depends upon Himself.” His attributes are included in what is meant by His self. He, glorified is He, is self-sufficient, having no need of anything besides Him, while everything besides Him depends upon Him.

These points are discussed at length elsewhere. Ibn Rushd said: “The objection raised against those who deny a multiplicity of attributes is that