that did not previously exist, necessarily either in the agent, in the effect, or in both. If this is so, and we require every newly arisen state to have an agent, then the agent of that newly arisen state must either be another agent—in which case the original agent would not be the first, nor would it be sufficient unto itself in performing its act, but would depend on another ن—or the agent of that state, which is a condition of its acting, must be the agent itself ن. In that case, the act initially supposed to proceed from it would not be its first act; rather, its production of that state, which is a condition of the effect, would precede its production of the effect.”

He said: “As you see, this follows necessarily, unless one allows that some states arising in agents do not require anything to bring them into existence.

“This is implausible except on the view of those who allow that things can come into existence of their own accord. This was the position of the earliest ancients who denied the agent, and it is a position whose untenability is self-evident.”

He is therefore told ك: “You have argued that your opponents among the theologians must posit an event arising without a newly arisen cause, and you have stated that this is self-evidently impossible. This is the familiar argument by which the Dahrī philosophers gained the upper hand over their opponents among the