And if it is said, “Rather, something arose in it by which it became the agent of what arises in the soul,” the question is asked: What caused that to arise?

If it is said, “What arose was the soul’s preparedness to receive an emanation of activity through which it forms conceptions and wills,” the reply is: That preparedness itself came into existence, and the question of what caused it to arise is no different from the question of what caused anything else to arise. Thus, one of two alternatives is unavoidable: either events arise without a newly arisen cause, or they arise from something that moves. Either alternative invalidates their position. They themselves say that the first is self-evidently false, so they must accept the second.

He has thus raised against his opponents an objection that applies even more strongly to himself, thereby showing that the position of his fellow philosophers is even more unsound. For he said:

“What the Ash‘arīs cannot escape is positing a first agent and positing an act that has a beginning. For they cannot suppose that the agent’s state in relation to the effect brought into existence is exactly the same when it acts as when it does not act. There must therefore be a newly arisen state and a relation