and the same is true of motion and that which moves. Existence, however, is not like this, because it is not an attribute additional to the essence. Thus every existent that was not at one time existent in potentiality and at another time existent, because it is not an attribute additional to the essence; thus every existent that was not at one time existent in potentiality and at another time existent in actuality exists of itself. That which moves exists only together with the motive power; hence everything that moves needs a mover.”

The reply is: When you say, “Then what is nonexistent will come into existence from itself,” do you mean that the very thing that was nonexistent comes into existence from the nonexistent essence, or do you mean that the nonexistent motion comes into existence from the moving essence?

The first is inconceivable, for what is nonexistent has no existence whatsoever, such that one could conceive of its own essence or anything else coming into existence from it. An existent coming into existence from something nonexistent is impossible by rational necessity, and the notion that what is nonexistent brings itself into existence is self-evidently false.

If you mean the second, then the consequent and the antecedent are one and the same: that which moves of itself has its previously nonexistent motion arise from itself.

The assertion that, if this is possible, something nonexistent may come into existence from a nonexistent essence is rejected; indeed, it is false and known to be false.

As for his statement, “For the coming into existence of what is nonexistent is the passage of what is potential into actuality, and the same is true of motion and that which moves,” the reply is: At most, this establishes that they share something in common. How, then, does their sharing one thing entail that they share something else, despite the evident difference? For his statement