the underlying rational meaning. Someone who calls such a thing “composition” or “combination” should therefore be asked: “Do you mean that there is something here produced by an assembler and combiner, or that there is an essence possessing attributes?”

The first is not conceded, for no one among Allah’s creation maintains that His inseparable attributes depend upon an agent who combines and assembles His essence and attributes.

If you mean the second, it is conceded. Yet you have no proof that the eternal, necessarily existent essence, which necessarily possesses attributes, requires someone to assemble its attributes within it. This is why Abū Hāmid said that this is like saying, “Every existent thing (mawjūd) requires someone who brings it into existence (mūjid).” Had he said “a finder (wājid),” this would have corresponded more closely to the wording.

This is correct, for mawjūd is the passive participle of wajada, yajidu (“to find”), whose active participle is wājid (“finder”).

Thus, if someone says, “Every existent thing requires a finder or someone who brings it into existence,” merely on the basis of the wording, this is like saying, “Every composite requires an assembler,” merely on the basis of the wording. Yet “existent” means something that has reality in itself; it does not mean something that another has found or brought into existence. Likewise, by “composite” here they mean something possessing an attribute that subsists in it, or something containing multiple aspects and plurality. They do not mean something assembled by another.

Those who employ these fallacies concerning the terms “combination” and “composition” have fallen into the same error as their counterparts concerning the terms “specification” and “determination,” for the issue is the same in both cases. Let the discerning reader pay close attention to this, for it will dispel many doubts for him.