had their parts separated and then assembled. By “composite” they may also mean something composed of attributes, as when they say that a human being is composed of genus and differentia—that is, a rational (speaking) animal. These two attributes have never existed apart from one another: rationality cannot exist without animality, nor can animality exist without rationality or some corresponding attribute, such as the capacity to neigh and the like.

Abū Hāmid and others like him addressed these thinkers in their own terminology, according to which something possessing an inseparable attribute is called “composite.” They said to them, “You have asserted that this meaning, which you call ‘composition,’ is impossible for the necessarily existent Being.” Their claim that “every composite requires an assembler” is thus a fallacy arising from ambiguity in the word “composite.” For their opponents had not conceded that an act of composition performed by an assembler was involved, such that one could say that the composite requires an assembler. Rather, there is an essence possessing attributes inseparable from it. If someone says, “Everything possessing inseparable attributes requires someone to assemble and combine its essence and attributes,” his statement is false. Their claim here that “every composite requires an assembler” is of this kind.

The same applies to the statement, “Every combination requires someone to combine it.” More than one person uses such arguments to deny meanings that someone has labelled “combination” and “composition.” The person making the argument then bases his reasoning merely on the use of the term, without considering