that is eternal, then eternal accidents exist, one of which is composition. For the fundamental premise on which they base the necessary temporal origination of accidents is that a body is composed of its parts only after those parts have been separate.

Thus, if they admit an eternal composite, there can be conjunction that was not preceded by separation, and motion that was not preceded by rest. If this is possible, a body with eternal accidents can exist, and their claim that whatever cannot be free of temporally originated events must itself have a temporal beginning is no longer valid.

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary on the statements of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd]

I say: What Abū Hāmid stated is sound and refutes the philosophers’ position. What Ibn Rushd stated arose only from the ambiguity and multiple meanings of the expression. His argument here is more sophistical than that of Ibn Sīnā, which he acknowledged to be unsound and weak.

These philosophers said to Abū Hāmid and those who affirm the divine attributes: “If you affirm an essence, an attribute, and the attribute’s inherence in the essence, then it is composite; and every composite requires one who composes it.”

He replied to them: “To say, ‘Every composite requires one who composes it,’ is like saying, ‘Every existing thing requires one who brings it into existence.’”

His point was that, in what you have called “composition,” being composite means no more than that the essence possesses attributes inhering in it. It does not mean that something was previously separate and was then assembled by someone, nor even that there is anything capable of being separated. For the discussion concerns only affirming the inseparable attributes of the Necessary Existent