is a condition for the existence of the second, while the second is not a condition for the existence of the first.

In the first case, the composite cannot be eternal, because composition itself is a condition for the existence of the parts. Thus, the parts cannot be the cause of the composition, nor can the composition be its own cause—unless a thing could be its own cause.

In the second case, where neither is a condition for the existence of the other, things of this kind, if neither is by nature inseparable from the other, can only be composed by an agent external to them.

If, however, one is a condition for the existence of the other, but not conversely—as with a non-substantial attribute and its subject—then, if the subject is eternal and its nature is such that the attribute never departs from it, the composite is eternal. If this is so, then anyone who admits the possibility of an eternal composite cannot demonstrate, by the Ashʿarī method, that every body has a temporal beginning. For if there exists a composite