like existence, for composition is like setting something in motion: that is, an attribute arising from being acted upon, additional to the essence of the things that undergo composition, whereas existence is an attribute of that very essence. Moreover, composite things cannot be divided into those composed of themselves and those composed by something else, such that the reasoning must ultimately lead to an eternal composite, just as reasoning about existing things ultimately leads to an eternal existent.

Furthermore, if matters are as we have said—that composition is something additional to existence—someone may say: if something composed of itself exists, then something moving of itself will exist; and if something moving of itself exists, then something nonexistent will come into existence of itself. For the coming into existence of something nonexistent is the passage from potentiality to actuality, and the same applies to motion and the thing in motion.”

He said: “The decisive distinction in this question is that a composite must fall into one of these cases: each of its two parts, or of the several parts from which it is composed, is a condition for the existence of the other in two different respects; or none is such a condition; or one of them