Ibn Sīnā, who claimed that if existence itself entails a necessarily existent being, then the Necessary Existent possesses these characteristics that negate these attributes. He says, “He has neither definitional parts nor quantitative parts.” This is what he means.

[Al-Ghazālī’s discussion in Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers)]

The ancient philosophers, however, did not establish the Necessary Existent by this method, but through an argument from motion. When Ibn Rushd the grandson challenged Abū Hāmid’s discussion, he could not defend Ibn Sīnā. Rather, he showed that the method Ibn Sīnā had followed was weak, just as Abū Hāmid had stated. He himself advanced another argument which he thought was strong, although it was weaker than Ibn Sīnā’s method.

After presenting the position attributed to philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā and his like, and explaining that they denied those five kinds of composition, Abū Hāmid said:

“Despite this, they describe the Creator, exalted is He, as a principle, first, existent, a single substance, eternal, everlasting, knowing, intellectually apprehending, intellect, intellectually apprehended, an agent, a creator, willing, powerful, living, a lover, beloved, pleasurable, experiencing pleasure, generous, and pure good. They claimed that all these expressions signify a single meaning containing no multiplicity.”