and the hadith contain indications that the false meaning was not intended. Rejecting that meaning therefore requires neither separate evidence nor an interpretation that departs from what the wording entails and implies.

Since this is so, the counterargument based on the attributes holds under each of the three views, for the attributes necessarily possess particular characteristics. If everything possessing particular characteristics requires a determining factor distinct from itself, it follows that the attributes of Allah Most High require something distinct from Him.

I later found that Abū al-Hasan al-Āmidī had mentioned this argument presented by al-Shahrastānī and explained its weakness in his book entitled Ghāyat al-Marām fī ‘Ilm al-Kalām (The Ultimate Aim in Theology). In discussing the denial of Allah’s being above and related matters, he said:

“Some of our fellow scholars have adopted a comprehensive approach in refuting these people, saying: ‘If the Creator had a definite magnitude, assumed a particular form, were bounded by a limit and an endpoint, occupied a particular direction, and underwent change through an attribute newly arising within His essence, He would have been brought into existence. For sound reason judges that all magnitudes are equally possible: no magnitude or shape can be conceived without its being possible for Him to have a different one. His possessing the particular magnitude, shape, or other characteristic that He has would therefore require a determining factor. If He required a determining factor, the Creator would have been brought into existence.’”

Al-Āmidī said: “This line of argument, however, is not strong, because