and a group of others do, then, apart from the many respects in which this is false, what they describe is not absolute. Rather, it is an existent qualified by negative and relational conditions. This gives it a specificity distinguishing it from all other existents, however it is conceived.

It may then be said: whatever the intellect identifies must have a reality peculiar to it that distinguishes it from everything else, whatever it may be. Everything that exists in external reality must likewise have an existence peculiar to it that distinguishes it from everything else. If everything distinguished by something peculiar to it must have an external determiner, then it would be impossible for any existent to exist independently, for any reality to exist independently, or for there to be any necessary existence.

Moreover, contradiction, impossible circular dependence, and an impossible infinite regress would follow. For if everything possessing a distinctive feature requires something separate from it to determine that feature, this second thing either requires a determiner or does not. If it does not, the universal proposition is refuted—which is precisely the desired conclusion.

If it depends on the first, circular causal dependence follows; if it depends on something else, an infinite regress of causes follows. Both are impossible by the agreement of rational people.

And if someone were to suppose that concomitant circular dependence follows—meaning that each of the two things possessing distinctive features exists together with the other,