and a different size while retaining the reality that makes it what it is. But if its reality undergoes transformation, its size and attributes are all the more liable to transformation.

Furthermore, we know that the heavens we observe could have attributes other than these only through separate evidence; we do not know this self-evidently or through sensory perception. Hence, many rational people have disputed this, without sharing any particular doctrine passed from one to another. Were this possibility self-evident, it would not be disputed by groups of rational people who had not colluded upon a position, for such people do not agree to deny self-evident truths.

It may then be said that this very argument can be countered by considering realities themselves and their inseparable attributes. One may say: every existent has a reality peculiar to it, distinguishing it from others; thus, its having that particular reality rather than any other requires a determining cause.

Likewise, one may say: every existent has inseparable attributes peculiar to it; thus, its having those particular attributes rather than others requires a determining cause.

It is well known, through self-evident reason and the agreement of rational people, that there must be an eternal existent necessary in itself ن, and a contingent existent that has come into being ن. For we observe things coming into being, and whatever comes into being must be possible, since otherwise it would not exist. Nor is it necessary in itself, for otherwise it would not