attributes. There is no doubt that a thing’s qualitative character and attributes are more inseparable from it than its size. Its qualitative character is more intrinsic to it than its quantity, and its having a particular size is less intrinsic to it than its having a particular attribute. Thus, the distinctive qualities of fire, water, and air are more inseparable from them than any particular size.

It may therefore be said: if it can be established that every body can possess attributes different from those it presently has, and that whatever is such is contingent or has come into existence, this would constitute a general proof, not one confined to things possessing size. If this cannot be established, there is no difference between size and anything else.

One of the methods mentioned by al-Rāzī and others for establishing the existence of the Maker, exalted is He, is to argue from the contingency of a body’s attributes or their coming into existence. Those who follow this method make no distinction between size and other attributes.

One might then ask: when someone says, “Anything possessing a size could be larger or smaller,” or “Anything possessing an attribute could have an attribute different from it,” or something similar, do you mean possibility in the mind or possibility in external reality? The difference is that possibility in the mind means not knowing that something is impossible: there is nothing in one’s mind that rules it out. Possibility in external reality means knowing that it is possible in external reality.