considered in general, just as its specific attributes are more inseparable from it than size in general. Indeed, the mathematical body conceived in the mind cannot be posited without size, yet it can be posited devoid of all attributes, because what is posited is a body encompassing all bodies. It is therefore conceived in abstraction from all attributes, just as a number is posited in abstraction from all the things counted.

Similarly, when a person imagines bodies after seeing them—such as a human being, a horse, a tree, a house, a city, a mountain, or the like—he can imagine them without imagining any of their attributes, such as their colors or anything else, but he cannot imagine them while denying them any size. Thus, the association of bodies in general with size in general is like the association of things possessing attributes in general with attributes in general. The association of a particular body with its size is like its association with its particular attribute and distinctive nature.

Everything has a nature peculiar to it, a size, and attributes inhering in it. 0 Thus, there are three things here: size, nature, and the attributes of that nature.

To say, “Anything possessing a size could have a size different from that size,” is like saying, “Anything possessing attributes could exist with attributes different from those attributes.” This is a closer comparison than saying, “Anything possessing a nature could exist with a nature different from that nature.”

But for the present argument, it is enough to accord size the same status as the other