and bodies are originated in time, then all accidents must be originated in time, since they cannot subsist in anything other than substances and bodies. The world comprises nothing beyond substances and accidents, and must therefore be originated in time.

Al-Āmidī said: “This approach is also weak, for someone might say: Although the first premise is conceded, the second—that everything requiring a particularizer is originated in time—is disputed. What was offered to establish it is invalid in light of the foregoing discussion of the first approach. Even if we concede that the attributes in question are originated in time, it does not follow that substances and bodies are originated in time, since these attributes could succeed one another in them without limit. That conclusion can only be reached by recourse to the earlier demonstration that a succession of temporally originated events cannot have no first event to which it can be traced.”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary on al-Āmidī’s remarks]

I say: This approach is weaker than the argument from motion and rest, for it requires everything that the latter requires, but not conversely, since both require demonstrating