[The sixth argument]

His statement, “If no condition is conjoined with it—neither the presence of a cause nor its absence—the third alternative remains for it by virtue of its essence,” implies that this third alternative belongs to it by virtue of its essence only when neither of the two conditions is conjoined with it. Yet it is known that one of the two must be conjoined with it. Thus, if it has possibility only when free of such conjunction, but it is never free of it, then no possibility belongs to it by virtue of its essence at all. For he has deemed whatever cannot be nonexistent necessary, whether necessary in itself or through another; and whatever is necessary is not possible. It is possible only when neither the cause of its existence nor the cause of its nonexistence is conjoined with it. This is further established by:

[The seventh argument]

This statement implies that, when conjoined with the condition of the cause’s presence, it is necessary and has no possibility by virtue of its essence. The premise is that it exists and that whatever exists is either necessary or possible; and at the time of its existence, it has