any condition,” or says, “On condition that what brings it into existence is absent, or without stipulating its presence; it is impossible in the first case and possible in the second,”

he may be answered:

Rather, it is impossible in both cases. When considered without any condition, its existence is impossible; likewise when considered apart from the presence of the agent.

This is because it can exist only through the agent, and its existence without the agent is impossible. Thus, when considered apart from what necessarily accompanies its existence, its existence is impossible. Impossibility encompasses both what is impossible in itself and what is impossible owing to something else, just as existence encompasses both what exists through itself and what exists through something else. Impossibility does not require that a condition—the absence of its cause—be attached to it. Rather, if the cause of its existence is not conjoined with it, it is impossible. The intellect apprehends its impossibility without that which brings it into existence, even if the thought that it has been conjoined with the absence of its cause never occurs to it. Merely being considered apart from conjunction with what brings it into existence makes it impossible, just as conjunction with the absence of its cause makes it impossible.

This is clarified by the fact that the absence of the cause is nothing. Thus, its conjunction with the absence of the cause is conjunction with sheer nonexistence. Its status therefore does not differ between supposing this conjunction to be absent and its absence, unless something that necessitates its existence is conjoined with it. Otherwise, without that accompanying factor which necessitates its existence, it is impossible and nonexistent.

The reason is that this conjunction is not what necessitates its nonexistence in reality; rather, it is an indication of nonexistence. There can be multiple indications, and the converse does not follow from an indication: its absence does not entail the absence of what it indicates, unless the two necessarily accompany one another. Thus, when a thing is considered together with its opposite, it is impossible; when considered together with the absence of its agent, it is impossible. Each of these considerations indicates its impossibility. Likewise, when considered without its necessary condition, it is impossible; and when considered without its necessary concomitant